Abstract
AbstractThe paper critiques two recent suggestions, by Lei Zhong and Thomas Kroedel, about how to apply the interventionist theory of causation to cases where supervenient properties, particularly mental properties, are involved. According to both suggestions, we should hold variables corresponding to supervenient properties fixed when intervening on the subvenient properties with respect to a putative effect variable and vice versa. The paper argues that both suggestions are problematic. Zhong’s suggestion ultimately requires ad hoc exemptions from the holding-fixed requirement. Kroedel’s suggestion entails severe constraints on the construction of causal models. Overall, retaining the holding-fixed requirements of interventionism for cases of supervenient properties comes at a significant price.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Reference22 articles.
1. Baumgartner, M. (2009). Interventionist causal exclusion and non-reductive physicalism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 23, 161–178.
2. Blanchard, T. (2023). The causal efficacy of composites: A dilemma for interventionism. Philosophical Studies, 180, 2685‒2706.
3. Eronen, M. I. (2012). Pluralistic physicalism and the causal exclusion argument. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2, 219–232.
4. Halpern, J. Y., & Hitchcock, C. (2010). Actual causation and the art of modeling. In R. Dechter, H. Geffner & J. Y. Halpern (Eds.), Heuristics, probability and causality: A tribute to Judea Pearl. College Publications.
5. Hitchcock, C. (2007). Prevention, preemption, and the principle of sufficient reason. Philosophical Review, 116, 495–532.