Abstract
AbstractMethodological individualists often claim that any social phenomenon can ultimately be explained in terms of the actions and interactions of individuals. Any Nagelian version of methodological individualism requires that there be bridge laws that translate social statements into individualistic ones. We show that Nagelian individualism can be put to logical scrutiny by making the relevant social and individualistic languages fully explicit and mathematically precise. In particular, we prove that the social statement that a group of (at least two) agents performs a deontically admissible group action cannot be expressed in a well-established deontic logic of agency that models every combination of actions, omissions, abilities, and obligations of finitely many individual agents.
Funder
FP7 Ideas: European Research Council
FP7 People: Marie-Curie Actions
Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek
Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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