1. Aguilar, J. H. (2012). Basic causal deviance, action repertoires, and reliability. Philosophical Issues, 22, 1–19.
2. Ainslie, G. (2001). Breakdown of will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. Bishop, J. (1989). Natural agency: An essay on the causal theory of action. New York: Cambridge University Press.
4. Christensen, W. D., & Hooker, C. A. (2001). Self-directed agents. In J. S. MacIntosh (Ed.), Naturalism, evolution and intentionality (Vol. 27, pp. 19–52). Ottawa, CA: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Special Supplementary Volume.
5. Clark, A. (2007). Soft selves and ecological control. In D. Ross, D. Spurrett, H. Kincaid, & G. L. Stephens (Eds.), Distributed cognition and the will (pp. 101–122). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.