Abstract
AbstractA growing consensus in the literature on agentive modals has it that ability modals like ‘can’ or ‘able to’ have a dual, i.e. interpretations of ‘must’ or ‘cannot but’ which stand to necessity as ability stands to possibility. We argue that this thesis (which we call ‘Agentive Duality’) is much more controversial than meets the eye. While Agentive Duality follows from the orthodox possibility analysis of ability given natural assumptions, it sits uneasily with a wide range of alternative proposals which are unified by the idea that ability requires control. In particular, we show that against the background of a control requirement on ability, Agentive Duality can be used to derive absurd predictions featuring this dual. Far from being a purely definitional thesis, Agentive Duality thus affords a new lens through which to assess the long-standing debate between possibility analyses of ability and their discontents.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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