Abstract
AbstractRecent years have seen the rise of fittingness-first views, which take fittingness to be the most basic normative feature, in terms of which other normative features can be explained. This paper poses a serious difficulty for the fittingness-first approach by showing that existing fittingness-first accounts cannot plausibly accommodate an important class of reasons: reasons not to believe a proposition. There are two kinds of reasons not to believe a proposition: considerations that are counterevidence; and considerations that count against believing the proposition without indicating that it is false. I will argue that the fittingness-first accounts have trouble accommodating reasons of the latter kind.
Funder
Universität Duisburg-Essen
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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