1. Barker, S. J. (2003). Truth and conventional implicature. Mind, 112, 1–33.
2. Barker, S. J. (2004). Renewing meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3. Barker, S. J. (2007a). Semantics beyond the distinction between sense and force. In Savvas Tsohatzidis (Ed.), Illocutions, institutions and intentionality: Essays on themes from the philosophy of John Searle (pp. 190–2011). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Barker, S. J., (2007b). Global expressivism. Online book manuscript. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/696/1/BOOKGE.pdf .
5. Barker, S. J. (2014). Pure versus hybrid expressivism and the enigma of conventional implicature. In Guy Fletcher & Mike Ridge (Eds.), Having it both ways: Hybrid theories and modern metaethics (pp. 206–230). Oxford: Oxford University Press.