Abstract
AbstractCall a quantifier ‘unrestricted’ if it ranges over absolutely all objects. Arguably, unrestricted quantification is often presupposed in philosophical inquiry. However, developing a semantic theory that vindicates unrestricted quantification proves rather difficult, at least as long as we formulate our semantic theory within a classical first-order language. It has been argued that using a type theory as framework for our semantic theory provides a resolution of this problem, at least if a broadly Fregean interpretation of type theory is assumed. However, the intelligibility of this interpretation has been questioned. In this paper I introduce a type-free theory of properties that can also be used to vindicate unrestricted quantification. This alternative emerges very naturally by reflecting on the features on which the type-theoretic solution of the problem of unrestricted quantification relies. Although this alternative theory is formulated in a non-classical logic, it preserves the deductive strength of classical strict type theory in a natural way. The ideas developed in this paper make crucial use of Russell’s notion of range of significance.
Funder
H2020 European Research Council
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Reference50 articles.
1. Bealer, G. (1982). Quality and concept. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
2. Boolos, G. (1975). On second-order logic. Journal of Philosophy, 72, 509–527.
3. Boolos, G. (1984). To be is to be a value of a variable (or to be some value of some variables). Journal of Philosophy, 81, 430–449.
4. Button, T., & Trueman, R. (in press). Against cumulative type theory. Review of Symbolic Logic.
5. Cantini, A. (2009). Paradoxes, self-reference and truth in the 20th century. In D. Gabbay & J. Woods (Eds.), Handbook of the history of logic (Vol. 5, pp. 875–1013). Elsevier.