Abstract
AbstractAre interpersonal comparisons of desire possible? Can we give an account of how facts about desires are grounded that underpins such comparisons? This paper supposes the answer to the first question is yes, and provides an account of the nature of desire that explains how this is so. The account is a modification of the interpretationist metaphysics of representation that the author has recently been developing. The modification is to allow phenomenological affective valence into the “base facts” on which correct interpretation is grounded. To use this extra resource within that theory to vindicate interpersonal comparisons, we will need to appeal rational connections between level of valence and level of desire, which this paper sets out and examines.
Funder
european research council
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Reference23 articles.
1. Arrow, K. J. (1950). A difficulty in the concept of social welfare. Journal of Political Economy, 58(4), 328–346.
2. Bacharach, M. (2006). Beyond individual choice: Teams and frames in game theory. Princeton University Press.
3. Barlassina, L., & Hayward, M. K. (2019). More of me!, Less of me! Mind, 128(512), 1013–1044.
4. Feldman Barrett, L., & Russell, J. A. (1999). The structure of current affect: Controversies and emerging consensus. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 8(1), 10–14.
5. Feldmab Barrett, L. (2017a). The theory of constructed emotion: An active inference account of interoception and categorization. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 12(1), 1–23.