Abstract
AbstractThis paper addresses the question whether future contingents are knowable, that is, whether one can know that things will go a certain way even though it is possible that things will not go that way. First I will consider a long-established view that implies a negative answer, and draw attention to some endemic problems that affect its credibility. Then I will sketch an alternative line of thought that prompts a positive answer: future contingents are knowable, although our epistemic access of them is limited in some important respects.
Funder
Università degli Studi di Torino
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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