1. Imre Lakatos: »Falsifikation and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes«. In: I. L./Alan Musgrave (Eds.): Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. (Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London 1965, IV). Cambridge 1970, pp. 91–196, hier p. 138; wieder in: I. L: Philosophical Papers. Ed. by John Worrall/Gregory Currie. Cambridge et. al. 1978. Vol. 1, p. 52.
2. Vgl. Imre Lakatos: »History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions«. In: Roger C. Buck/Robert S. Cohen (Eds.): In Memory of Rudolf Carnap. (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8). Dordrecht 1971, pp. 91–136, hier p. 91 das Kant entlehnte Diktum: »Philosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of science without philosophy of science is blind«.
3. Vgl. Jürgen Mittelstraß: »Rationale Rekonstruktionen der Wissenschaftsgeschichte«. In: Peter Janich (Hrsg.): Wissenschaftstheorie und Wissenschaftsforschung. München 1981, S. 89–111, hier S. 110.
4. So Ronald N. Giere: »History and Philosophy of Science: Intimate Relationship or Marriage of Convenience?« In: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (1973), pp. 282–297.
5. So John Hedley Brooke: »Avogadro’s Hypothesis and its Fate: A Case Study in the Failure of Case Studies«. In: History of Science 19 (1981), pp. 235–273; hier pp. 249ff.;