Abstract
AbstractThis paper analyzes the design of monetary and fiscal policies in a currency union by focusing on the capacity to react to symmetric and asymmetric financial shocks. The model is constructed in order to mimic the institutional design adopted for the policy making in the EMU. The paper shows how a currency union set-up like the one adopted by the EMU can easily cope with symmetric financial shocks. However, it shows how in the face of asymmetric shocks more space for fiscal interventions is crucial, especially in more peripheral member countries.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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