On the “Strength” of Behavior

Abstract

AbstractThe place of the concept of response strength in a natural science of behavior has been the subject of much debate. This article reconsiders the concept of response strength for reasons linked to the foundations of a natural science of behavior. The notion of response strength is implicit in many radical behaviorists’ work. Palmer (2009) makes it explicit by applying the response strength concept to three levels: (1) overt behavior, (2) covert behavior, and (3) latent or potential behavior. We argue that the concept of response strength is superfluous in general, and an explication of the notion of giving causal status to nonobservable events like latent behavior or response strength is harmful to a scientific endeavor. Interpreting EEG recordings as indicators of changes in response strength runs the risk of reducing behavior to underlying mechanisms, regardless of whether such suggestions are accompanied by behavioral observations. Many radical behaviorists understand behavior as a discrete unit, inviting conceptual mistakes reflected in the notion of response strength. A molar view is suggested as an alternative that accounts for the temporally extended nature of behavior and avoids the perils of a response-strength based approach.