Abstract
Abstract
Franke Philosophy & Technology, 35(4), 1-7, (2022) offers an interesting claim that algorithmic transparency as manipulation does not necessarily follow that it is good or bad. Different people can have good reasons to adopt different evaluative attitudes towards this manipulation. Despite agreeing with some of his observations, this short reply will examine three crucial misconceptions in his arguments. In doing so, it defends why we are morally obliged to care about the manipulative potential of algorithmic transparency. It suggests that we as society have a moral duty to incorporate the value of transparency into algorithmic systems while keeping algorithmic transparency itself sensitive to power relations.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science,Philosophy
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