Abstract
AbstractHere, I take alethic views of understanding to be all views that hold that whether an explanation is true or false matters for whether that explanation provides understanding. I then argue that there is (as yet) no naturalistic defence of alethic views of understanding in cognitive science, because there is no agreement about the correct descriptions of the content of cognitive scientific explanations. I use this claim to argue for the provisional acceptance of afactivism in cognitive science, which is the view that the truth or falsity of an explanation of cognition is irrelevant to whether that explanation provides understanding. I conclude by discussing the relation between understanding in cognitive science and understanding in other domains.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science,Philosophy
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