Abstract
AbstractWe consider a vertical supply chain in which a monopoly retailer produces a good by assembling a number of essential components each of which is owned by a monopoly. Rather than making the common assumption that the component price is set in the same way for each owner, we investigate the possibility that the retailer may profit by bargaining with some owners in a group, whilst others set their component price to maximize own profit. Furthermore, component owners can self-select into one of these groups, and the retailer can affect group formation by adjusting the order of negotiations. We present conditions under which the retailer can encourage the formation of a bargaining group, and thereby improve its own and industry profit.
Funder
UiT The Arctic University of Norway
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Cited by
2 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献