Bilateral comparisons and consistent fair division rules in the context of bankruptcy problems-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Bilateral comparisons and consistent fair division rules in the context of bankruptcy problems

Published:1997-03 Issue:1 Volume:26 Page:11-25
ISSN:0020-7276
Container-title:International Journal of Game Theory
language:en
Short-container-title:Int J Game Theory

Author:

Dagan Nir,Volij Oscar

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,Economics and Econometrics,Social Sciences (miscellaneous),Mathematics (miscellaneous),Statistics and Probability

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BF01262509.pdf

Reference12 articles.

1. Aumann RJ, Maschler M (1985) Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the talmud. Journal of Economic Theory 36: 195?213

2. Dagan N, Volij O (1993) The bankruptcy problem, a cooperative bargaining approach. Mathematical Social Sciences 26: 287?297

3. Dagan N, Serrano R, Volij O (1994) A non-cooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules. Discussion Paper 9411, CentER for Economic Research Tilburg, The Netherlands

4. Fishburn PC (1970) Utility theory for decision making, John Wiley and Sons, NY

5. Lensberg T (1987) Stability and collective rationality. Econometrica 55: 935?961

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