Abstract
AbstractIndicative conditionals and tendency causal claims are closely related (e.g., Frosch and Byrne, 2012), but despite these connections, they are usually studied separately. A unifying framework could consist in their dependence on probabilistic factors such as high conditional probability and statistical relevance (e.g., Adams, 1975; Eells, 1991; Douven, 2008, 2015). This paper presents a comparative empirical study on differences between judgments on tendency causal claims and indicative conditionals, how these judgments are driven by probabilistic factors, and how these factors differ in their predictive power for both causal and conditional claims.
Funder
HORIZON EUROPE European Research Council
Università degli Studi di Torino
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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