Abstract
AbstractThe principle of compositionality claims that the content of a complex concept is determined by its constituent concepts and the way in which they are composed. However, for prototype concepts this principle is often too rigid. Blurring the division between conceptual composition and belief update has therefore been suggested (Hampton and Jönsson 2012). Inspired by this idea, we develop a normative account of how belief revision and meaning composition should interact in modifications such as “red apple” or “pet hamster”. We do this by combining the well-known selective modification model (Smith et al. Cognitive science 12(4):485–527 1988) with the rules of Bayesian belief update. Moreover, we relate this model to systems of defeasible reasoning as discussed in the field of artificial intelligence.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Philosophy,Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
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