Author:
Essl Andrea,Friedrich Kathrin,Schumacher Stefanie,von Bieberstein Frauke
Abstract
AbstractWe experimentally investigate the relevance of a cash upfront payment for the effort-enhancing effect of penalty contracts. We find that penalty contracts where participants receive the upfront payment physically before working on a real effort task induce more effort than penalty contracts where participants are only informed about the upfront payment. When comparing penalty contracts with economically-equivalent bonus contracts, we find that penalty contracts lead to higher effort provision than bonus contracts, but only if participants physically receive the upfront cash payment in advance. We suggest that the higher salience of the cash upfront payment might be a core driver of the detected framing effect. Our findings emphasize the importance of experimental design choices when studying framed incentive contracts.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Business, Management and Accounting