Moore's Paradox in Belief and Desire-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Moore's Paradox in Belief and Desire

Published:2013-05-21 Issue:1 Volume:29 Page:1-23
ISSN:0353-5150
Container-title:Acta Analytica
language:en
Short-container-title:Acta Anal

Author:

Williams John N.

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Philosophy

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-013-0189-1.pdf

Reference35 articles.

1. Armstrong, D. M. (1973). Belief, truth, and knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

2. Chan, T. (2010). Moore’s paradox is not just another pragmatic paradox. Synthese, 173(3), 211–229.

3. David, M. (2005). Truth as the primary epistemic goal: A working hypothesis. In E. Sosa & M. Steup (Eds.), Contemporary debates in epistemology (pp. 296–312). Oxford: Blackwell.

4. de Almeida, C. (2001). What Moore’s paradox is about. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62(1), 33–58.

5. de Almeida, C. (2007). Moorean absurdity: An epistemological analysis. In M. S. Green & J. N. Williams (Eds.), Moore’s paradox: New essays on belief, rationality and the first person (pp. 53–75). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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1. Moore′s paradox generalized;Theoria;2022-08-29

2. Norms for pure desire;THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science;2020-02-26

3. Once you think you’re wrong, you must be right: new versions of the preface paradox;Synthese;2018-09-19

4. Reasons to Desire and Desiring at Will;Metaphilosophy;2017-04

5. Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey;Philosophy Compass;2015-01