Disagreement, Points of View, and Truth-Relativism-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Disagreement, Points of View, and Truth-Relativism

Published:2022-02-16 Issue:4 Volume:37 Page:531-550
ISSN:0353-5150
Container-title:Acta Analytica
language:en
Short-container-title:Acta Anal

Author:

Hautamäki Antti^ORCID

Abstract

AbstractTruth-relativism is the claim that the truth of statements is dependent on the context in which they are made. In this article, truth-relativism is considered as a way to explain disagreements. Viewpoint relativism, a recent version of truth-relativism, is introduced as a useful framework to analyse how truth-relativism approaches disagreements. Viewpoint relativism is based on contextual semantics and the logic of viewpoint, which is a two-dimensional modal logic. In viewpoint relativism, the central concept is a point of view in relation to which truth claims are evaluated. Viewpoint relativism is compared to the truth-relativism of Peter Lasersohn and John MacFarlane. Finally, truth-relativism is defended against the critique of Paul Boghossian that it represents untenable ‘replacement relativism’.

Funder

University of Jyväskylä

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Philosophy

Link

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-021-00504-x.pdf

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