Abstract
AbstractThe new evil demon problem amounts to a difficult challenge for the externalist about epistemic justification. Many solutions to the problem have been proffered in the almost 40 years since its first appearance in the literature. Among the more promising responses is indexical reliabilism, a combination of two versions of actual world reliabilism where “actual” denotes either the world of utterance or a rigidly determined actual world. This paper does three things. First, it attempts to clarify indexical reliabilism and how it purports to solve the new evil demon problem. Second, it attempts to mitigate some of the prominent criticism that has been leveled against the theory. Third, it poses an explanatory challenge for the theory which remains even after all of the premises supporting indexical reliabilism are accepted. The conclusion is that indexical reliabilism is not tenable until a linguistic mechanism for the use of “actually reliable” has been offered that explains how the theory avoids collapsing into a two-concepts response to the new evil demon problem.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Reference28 articles.
1. Alston, W. P. (1985). Concepts of epistemic justification. The Monist, 68, 57–89.
2. Alston, W. P. (1993). Epistemic desiderata. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53(3), 527–551.
3. Armstrong. (2000). The thermometer-model of knowledge. In S. Bernecker & F. I. Dretske (Eds.). Knowledge: Readings in contemporary epistemology.
4. Ball, B., & Blome-Tillmann, M. (2012). Indexical reliabilism and the new evil Demon. Erkenntnis, 78(6), 1317–1336.
5. BonJour, L. (1980). Externalist theories of empirical knowledge. Midwest studies in philosophy, 5, 53–73.