Anti-realism in the philosophy of probability: Bruno de Finetti's subjectivism-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Anti-realism in the philosophy of probability: Bruno de Finetti's subjectivism

Published:1989-09 Issue:2-3 Volume:31 Page:239-261
ISSN:0165-0106
Container-title:Erkenntnis
language:en
Short-container-title:Erkenntnis

Author:

Galavotti Maria Carla

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Logic,Philosophy

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BF01236565.pdf

Reference52 articles.

1. Carnap, R.: 1950,Logical Foundations of Probability, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

2. Carnap, R.: 1952,The Continuum of Inductive Methods, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

3. Carnap, R.: 1962, ?The Aim of Inductive Logic?, in E. Nagel, P. Suppes and A. Tarski (eds.),Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Stanford University Press, Stanford.

4. Costantini, D. and L. Geymonat: 1982,Filosofia della probabilità, Feltrinelli, Milano.

5. de Finetti, B.: 1929, ?Funzione caratteristica di un fenomeno aleatorio?, inAtti del Congresso Internazionale dei matematici, Zanichelli, pp. 179?90. Also in de Finetti (1981), pp. 97?108.

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