Abstract
AbstractIn this article, I argue for the use of the hermeneutics of suspicion in the investigation of the conditions of our actions. I claim that by staying suspicious of immediate answers as well as manifest conditions, and remaining curious of other conditions that may influence us, we can come closer to an understanding of our actions and what structures them. By investigating the broad question of why we do what we do, I critically examine the concept of agency and its role in answering this question. I distinguish between two fundamentally different approaches to the understanding of our actions that relate to the concept of agency: On the one hand, is the agentic view that focuses on reasons and asserts that our agency is the basis of our actions. On the other hand, is the non-agentic view that focuses on causes and asserts that our actions are causally determined. To overcome this sharp distinction, I argue for a reconceptualisation concerning our understandings of why we act and of the human psyche itself. This reconceptualisation is twofold. Firstly, it consists of abandoning a simple causality in favour of the notion of catalysis. Secondly, it consists of viewing the psyche as an open system rather than a closed system. In linking the concept of catalysis with the hermeneutics of suspicion, I bring together the ontological and epistemological dimensions of my thinking. The concept of catalysis underlines the ontological complexity and multiplicity of the conditions of our actions and of the human psyche, while the introduction of the hermeneutics of suspicion tells us how we must face this epistemologically.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Cited by
1 articles.
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