Does the director election system matter? Evidence from majority voting-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Does the director election system matter? Evidence from majority voting

Published:2014-04-30 Issue:1 Volume:20 Page:1-41
ISSN:1380-6653
Container-title:Review of Accounting Studies
language:en
Short-container-title:Rev Account Stud

Author:

Ertimur Yonca,Ferri Fabrizio,Oesch David

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

General Business, Management and Accounting,Accounting

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11142-014-9284-9.pdf

Reference63 articles.

1. Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2008). Do directors perform for pay? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 46, 154–171.

2. Agrawal, A. (2012). Corporate governance objectives of labor union shareholders. Review of Financial Studies, 25, 187–226.

3. Allen, C. H. (2007). Study of majority voting in director elections. Neal, Gerber & Eisenberger LLP. http://www.ngelaw.com/files/upload/majoritystudy111207.pdf .

4. Armstrong, C., Gow, I. D., & Larcker, D. F. (2013). The efficacy of shareholder voting: Evidence from equity compensation plans. Journal of Accounting Research, 51, 909–950.

5. Bainbridge, S. (2005). The case for limited shareholder voting rights. UCLA Law Review, 53, 601–636.

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