Author:
Chen Ciao-Wei,Li Laura Yue
Abstract
AbstractJob vacancy duration reflects the time a firm spends searching, selecting, and hiring for a job opening. Capturing vacancy duration using the creation and deletion dates of job postings by US public firms, we examine the informativeness of vacancy duration for future firm profitability. We find that while firms that quickly fill low-skill job vacancies exhibit higher future profitability, firms that take more time to fill high-skill jobs exhibit higher future profitability. Our cross-sectional analyses across the benefits and costs of candidate selection and performance expectations suggest that the informativeness of vacancy duration comes from its reflection of firms’ hiring strategies. That is, firms expecting higher profitability recruit more intensively to avoid the opportunity cost associated with vacancies for low-skill jobs and to ensure the selection of high-quality workers for high-skill jobs. Further analyses show that the implication of job vacancy duration for future profitability is not incorporated timely in the capital markets, as evidenced by pessimistic analyst forecasts and positive earnings announcement returns in future quarters for firms with short (long) durations for low-skill (high-skill) jobs. These results demonstrate the informativeness of job vacancy duration for firm profitability and advance the understanding of firms’ hiring strategies.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Business, Management and Accounting,Accounting
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