Protocol completion incentive problems in cryptographic Vickrey auctions-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Protocol completion incentive problems in cryptographic Vickrey auctions

Published:2008-04-15 Issue:1-2 Volume:8 Page:57-77
ISSN:1389-5753
Container-title:Electronic Commerce Research
language:en
Short-container-title:Electron Commerce Res

Author:

Bradford Phillip G.,Park Sunju,Rothkopf Michael H.,Park Heejin

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Human-Computer Interaction,Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10660-008-9013-1.pdf

Reference41 articles.

1. Abe, M., & Suzuki, K. (2002). M+1-st price auction using homomorphic encryption. In Proceedings of the 5th international workshop on the practice and theory of Public Key Cryptosystems (PKC 2002): Vol. 2274. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (pp. 115–224). Berlin: Springer.

2. Abraham, I., Dolev, D., Gonen, R., & Halpern, J. Y. (2006). Distributed computing meets game theory: robust mechanisms for rational secret sharing and multiparty computation. Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC) (pp. 53–63).

3. Aigner, M. (1988). Combinatorial search. Wiley-Teubner.

4. Bradford, P. G., Park, S., & Rothkopf, M. H. (2004). Protocol completion incentive problems in cryptographic Vickrey auctions. In Proceedings of the seventh International Conference on Electronic Commerce Research (ICECR-7) (pp. 55–64). See http://rutcor.rutgers.edu/pub/rrr/reports2004/3_2004.pdf .

5. Brandt, F. (2002). A verifiable, bidder-resolved auction protocol. In R. Falcone, S. Barber, L. Korba & M. Singh (Eds.), Proceedings of first international joint conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS 2002) (pp. 18–25).

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