Abstract
Abstract
This article examines the determinants of the positioning of secondary states in the US-China conflict over market access for China’s Huawei. Our explanations draw on three branches of realism: balance-of-threat theory, patron-client theory, and Hirschman’s theory on trade relationships and foreign-policy convergence. For the dependent variable, we assemble a new dataset of the attitudes of 70 states toward Huawei’s investment aspirations. We present a series of ordered logit regression models from which three main patterns appear. First, less powerful states seem more acceptive of the Chinese company. Second, those states that rely on US security guarantees tend to be far more rejective of Huawei. Third, whereas trade with China appears to be a factor in the reasonings of other states, trade with the US is not. In sum, the patron-client theory offers the most cogent explanation of the divergence of responses to Huawei.
Funder
NTNU Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Political Science and International Relations,Sociology and Political Science
Cited by
7 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献