How Should Crypto Lending Be Regulated Under EU Law?

Author:

Avgouleas Emilios,Seretakis Alexandros

Abstract

AbstractThe collapse of Genesis is the latest in a cascade of failures of crypto lenders. The last year has seen numerous major crypto lenders, such as Celsius, Voyager and BlockFi, going out of business in domino-like fashion. The failures have revealed the vulnerabilities of crypto-market lenders’ business model, most notably the liquidity and maturity mismatches in their loan portfolios, and their markedly weak corporate governance. The present article explores avenues to regulate crypto lending within the framework of EU financial services regulation. It argues that crypto lenders should be taken as falling within the definition of credit institutions under EU law, and thus, as a result, should be subject to the stringent licensing and prudential requirements introduced by the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation. Prudential regulation is one of the ways that have been suggested for the regulation of crypto-market operators, alongside the investor protection framework. Taking into account that crypto lenders easily operate on a cross-border basis and that prudential regulation is fully harmonized in the EU, we take an EU-wide perspective and focus our analysis on EU law, rather than member state laws. In addition, prudential regulation can deal with any systemic risk issues with which investor protection regulation cannot deal. However, in order to avoid moral hazard and not give investors the false impression that crypto lenders are safe too-big-to fail institutions, we suggest that crypto lenders should not enjoy the full protection of prudential regulations. In particular, they should not be offered lender of last resort support and they should not be allowed to subscribe into a deposit insurance scheme. Even though it is often said that crypto markets pose no risk to the regulated sector due to limited interconnectedness, it should be noted that due to the high leverage of crypto investors, the real risk to the regulated sector comes from the possibility of crypto investors massively liquidating their positions in other asset markets.

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Law,Political Science and International Relations,Business and International Management

Reference68 articles.

1. Alexander R et al (2014) US regulation and structure of deposit products. Arnold & Porter Advisory, 14 October 2014. https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/advisories/2014/10/us-regulation-and-structure-of-deposit-products. Accessed 03 Mar 2023

2. Allen H (2022) DeFi: shadow banking 2.0? American University WCL Research Paper 02. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4038788. Accessed 03 Mar 2023

3. Aramonte S et al (2022) DeFi lending: intermediation without information. BIS Bull No 57. https://www.bis.org/publ/bisbull57.pdf. Accessed 03 Mar 2023

4. Armour J et al (2016) Principles of financial regulation. Oxford University Press, Oxford

5. Auer R et al (2022) Crypto trading and Bitcoin prices: evidence from a new database of retail adoption. BIS Working Papers No 1049. https://www.bis.org/publ/work1049.pdf. Accessed 03 Mar 2023

Cited by 3 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献 订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

同舟云学术

1.学者识别学者识别

2.学术分析学术分析

3.人才评估人才评估

"同舟云学术"是以全球学者为主线,采集、加工和组织学术论文而形成的新型学术文献查询和分析系统,可以对全球学者进行文献检索和人才价值评估。用户可以通过关注某些学科领域的顶尖人物而持续追踪该领域的学科进展和研究前沿。经过近期的数据扩容,当前同舟云学术共收录了国内外主流学术期刊6万余种,收集的期刊论文及会议论文总量共计约1.5亿篇,并以每天添加12000余篇中外论文的速度递增。我们也可以为用户提供个性化、定制化的学者数据。欢迎来电咨询!咨询电话:010-8811{复制后删除}0370

www.globalauthorid.com

TOP

Copyright © 2019-2024 北京同舟云网络信息技术有限公司
京公网安备11010802033243号  京ICP备18003416号-3