Abstract
AbstractWe analyze evidence production in merger control as a delegation problem in an inquisitorial competition policy system. The antitrust agency’s incentives to produce evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal depend critically on its action set. Allowing for a compromising remedy solution reduces information acquisition incentives, and could therefore reduce consumer welfare. The effort-frustrating effect of the remedy solution can be eliminated if a remedy solution can be implemented only after evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal has been produced.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Management of Technology and Innovation,Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management,Strategy and Management,Economics and Econometrics
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