Abstract
AbstractIn the present article, I address the issue of categorial representative contents, which, according to Husserl’s phenomenological theory, make knowledge possible by providing fullness to intuitive categorial acts. First, I discuss Husserl’s assertion that he no longer approves of his theory of categorial representation developed in Logical Investigations. I argue that the influential interpretation of Husserl’s self-criticism advanced by Dieter Lohmar is unfortunately misleading, as Husserl does not actually claim that categorial representatives are contents of reflection belonging to the realm of inner sensibility, as Lohmar contends. After offering an alternative view of Husserl’s authentic position in Logical Investigations, I examine other possible reasons for his later dissatisfaction. These reasons relate to Husserl’s changing views on the role of categorial representatives in empty thinking acts—necessarily involved in cognition—and the necessity of spontaneously repeating the passive synthesis between the intentional matters that function as categorial representatives in the predicative activity yielding knowledge.
Funder
Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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