Abstract
AbstractWe investigate the computational complexity of electoral control in elections. Electoral control describes the scenario where the election chair seeks to alter the outcome of the election by structural changes such as adding, deleting, or replacing either candidates or voters. Such control actions have been studied in the literature for a lot of prominent voting rules. We complement those results by solving several open cases for Copeland$$^{\alpha }$$
α
, maximin, k-veto, plurality with runoff, veto with runoff, Condorcet, fallback, range voting, and normalized range voting.
Funder
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Universität des Saarlandes
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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