Abstract
AbstractIn this paper, we introduce a notion of mergeable weighted majority games with the aim of providing the first characterization of the Colomer–Martínez power index (Colomer and Martínez in J Theor Polit 7(1):41–63, 1995). Furthermore, we define and characterize a new power index for the family of weighted majority games that combines ideas of the Public Good (Holler in Polit Stud 30(2):262–271, 1982) and Colomer–Martínez power indices. Finally, we analyze the National Assembly of Ecuador using these and some other well-known power indices.
Funder
Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad, Gobierno de España
Ministerio de Economìa, Industria y Competitividad, Gobierno de España
Xunta de Galicia
Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación
Ministry of Science and Technology
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Management Science and Operations Research,General Decision Sciences
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