A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

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A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players

Published:2015-03-29 Issue:1 Volume:229 Page:41-66
ISSN:0254-5330
Container-title:Annals of Operations Research
language:en
Short-container-title:Ann Oper Res

Author:

Arin J.,Feltkamp V.,Montero M.

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Management Science and Operations Research,General Decision Sciences

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10479-015-1841-5.pdf

Reference23 articles.

1. Arin, J., & Feltkamp, V. (1997). The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games. International Journal of Game Theory, 26, 61–73.

2. Arin, J., & Feltkamp, V. (2007). Coalitional games with veto players: Consistency, monotonicity and Nash outcomes. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 43, 855–870.

3. Arin, J., & Feltkamp, V. (2012). Coalitional games: Monotonicity and core. European Journal of Operational Research, 216, 208–213.

4. Arin, J., & Katsev, I. (2014). The SD-prenucleolus for TU games. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 80, 307–327.

5. Chang, C., & Hu, C.-C. (2008). A non-cooperative interpretation of the f-just rules of bankruptcy problems. Games and Economic Behavior, 63, 133–144.

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1. A Dynamic Multi-Player Bargaining Game with Veto Players;Journal of Systems Science and Complexity;2020-11-07

2. Political Community: The Policymakers;Regionalizing Global Human Rights Norms in Southeast Asia;2020-10-11

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