Abstract
AbstractPascal’s wager uses decision theory to argue that it is rational to attempt to nurture belief in God, based on the expected utility of believing (infinite happiness) compared to not believing (at best, only finite happiness). A belief in an eternal conscious torment in hell (infinite suffering) for non-believers makes the differences in expected utility even more apparent, strengthening the argument. Similar reasoning can also be used to calculate the expected moral value of actions, including procreation. Under theism, if possible future children might suffer eternal conscious torment, the expected moral value of procreation is extremely negative. This implies that theists have a moral obligation not to procreate, which for most theists, entails a moral obligation to be celibate or to undergo sterilisation surgery.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Reference30 articles.
1. Algander, P. (2011). A defence of the asymmetry in population ethics. Res Publica, 18(2), 145–157.
2. Benatar, D. (2006). Better never to have been: The harm of coming into existence. Oxford University Press.
3. Bengtson, V. L., Putney, N. M., & Harris, S. (2013). Families and faith. Oxford University Press.
4. Catholic Church. (1997). Catechism of the Catholic Church (2nd ed., pp. 2366–2367). Libreria Editrice Vaticana.
5. Chittick, W. C. (2007). Muslim eschatology. In J. L. Walls (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Eschatology. Oxford University Press.