Taxes versus quotas to limit global environmental risks: new insights into an old affair-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Taxes versus quotas to limit global environmental risks: new insights into an old affair

Published:2000-12 Issue:4 Volume:3 Page:399-423
ISSN:1432-847X
Container-title:Environmental Economics and Policy Studies
language:en
Short-container-title:Environ Econ Policy Stud

Author:

Endres Alfred,Ohl Cornelia

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law,Economics and Econometrics

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BF03354048.pdf

Reference37 articles.

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2. Barrett S (1997) The strategy of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements. Resource and Energy Economics 19:345–361

3. Barrett S (1998) Do international environmental agreements really work? Economic incentives and enforcement are crucial to a climate treaty. http://www.weathervane.rff.org/pointcpoint/pcp4/barrett.ht

4. Baumol WJ, Oates WE (1988) The theory of environmental policy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK

5. Brachinger HW, Weber M (1997) Risk as primitive: a survey of measures of perceived risk. OR Spectrum 4:235–250

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