Hydra: Practical Metadata Security for Contact Discovery, Messaging, and Voice Calls

Abstract

AbstractProtecting communications’ metadata can be as important as protecting their content, i.e., recognizing someone contacting a medical service may already allow to infer sensitive information. There are numerous proposals to implement anonymous communications, yet none provides it in a strong (but feasible) threat model in an efficient way. We propose Hydra, an anonymity system that is able to efficiently provide metadata security for a wide variety of applications. Main idea is to use latency-aware, padded, and onion-encrypted circuits even for connectionless applications. This allows to implement strong metadata security for contact discovery and text-based messages with relatively low latency. Furthermore, circuits can be upgraded to support voice calls, real-time chat sessions, and file transfers—with slightly reduced anonymity in presence of global observers. We evaluate Hydra using an analytical model as well as call simulations. Compared to other systems for text-based messaging, Hydra is able to decrease end-to-end latencies by an order of magnitude without degrading anonymity. Using a dataset generated by performing latency measurements in the Tor network, we further show that Hydra is able to support anonymous voice calls with acceptable quality of service in real scenarios. A first prototype of Hydra is published as open source.