Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms

Published:2011-11 Issue:4 Volume:31 Page:379-396
ISSN:0209-9683
Container-title:Combinatorica
language:en
Short-container-title:Combinatorica

Author:

Dobzinski Shahar,Nisan Noam

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Computational Mathematics,Discrete Mathematics and Combinatorics

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00493-011-2528-4.pdf

Reference33 articles.

1. A. Archer, C. Papadimitriou, K. Talwar and E. Tardos: An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agent, in: SODA’03.

2. Sanjeev Arora: Polynomial time approximation schemes for Euclidean traveling salesman and other geometric problems, Journal of the ACM 45(5) (1998), 753–782.

3. Moshe Babaioff and Liad Blumrosen: Computationally-feasible auctions for convex bundles, in: 7th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX). LNCS Vol. 3122. (2004), 27–38.

4. Yair Bartal, Rica Gonen and Noam Nisan: Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions, in: TARK 03.

5. Liad Blumrosen and Shahar Dobzinski: Welfare maximization in congestion games, in: IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, Preliminary version in EC’06.

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