Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games

Published:1987-09 Issue:3 Volume:16 Page:197-204
ISSN:0020-7276
Container-title:International Journal of Game Theory
language:en
Short-container-title:Int J Game Theory

Author:

Benoit J. -P.,Krishna V.

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,Economics and Econometrics,Social Sciences (miscellaneous),Mathematics (miscellaneous),Statistics and Probability

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BF01756291.pdf

Reference5 articles.

1. Benoit J-P, Krishna V (1985) Finitely repeated games. Econometrica 53:905–922

2. Friedman J (1985) Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon non-cooperative supergames. Journal of Economic Theory 35:390–398

3. Luce R, Raiffa H (1957) Games and decisions. Wiley, New York

4. Sorin S (1983) On repeated games with complete information. Manuscript Mathematics of Operations Research (forthcoming)

5. Van-Damme E (1983) Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept. Springer, Berlin

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