Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a nonempty core of a majority game-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a nonempty core of a majority game

Published:1975-12 Issue:4 Volume:4 Page:215-219
ISSN:0020-7276
Container-title:International Journal of Game Theory
language:en
Short-container-title:Int J Game Theory

Author:

Kaneko M.

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,Economics and Econometrics,Social Sciences (miscellaneous),Mathematics (miscellaneous),Statistics and Probability

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BF01769268.pdf

Reference5 articles.

1. Arrow, K.J.: Social Choice and Individual Values, New York 1951. 2nd ed. 1963.

2. Dorfman, R.: Social Decision without Social Preferences, M. Kaser and R. Porters (eds.): Planning and Markets Relations, pp. 117–129, London-Basingstoke 1971.

3. Dummett, M., andR. Farquharson: Stability in Voting, Econometrica. Vol.29, pp. 33–43, 1961.

4. Nakamura, K.: On thek-stability ofm-Quota Games, International Journal of Game Theory. Vol.1, pp. 161–172, 1971/72.

5. -: The Core of a Simple Game with Ordinal Preferences, forthcoming in: International Journal of Game Theory. 1975.

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