Abstract
AbstractFollowing a seminal definition by Gerald Dworkin, paternalism comprises interventions which interfere with the liberty or autonomy of a person, lack the concerned person’s consent and are conducted with benevolent intention. In a paper titled “The Concept of Paternalism” Dominik Düber advises abstaining from applying the notions of liberty and autonomy in a conceptual analysis of paternalism in order to avoid conceptual confusion and moral preconception regarding paternalism. In the present paper, I will argue to the contrary that both the concept and justification of paternalism depend dialectically on the notions of liberty and autonomy, respectively. The concept of paternalism alters its structure and meaning according to these notions. Likewise, the legal and ethical evaluation of particular instances of paternalism depend on the related concepts of liberty and autonomy.
Funder
Technische Universität Berlin
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Reference23 articles.
1. Ach, Johann S. and Arnd Pollmann. 2017. Moralisch problematisch – Was aus einem Problem ein moralisches Problem macht. In Natur und Erfahrung. Bausteine zu einer praktischen Philosophie der Gegenwart, ed. Mattias Hoesch and Sebastian Laukötter, 39–60, Münster: mentis.
2. Ach, Johann S. and Bettina Schöne-Seifert. 2014. Motor- und Handbremse – Die antipaternalistischen Ressourcen konsequentialistischer Ethik. In Paternalismus und Konsequentialismus, ed. Michael Kühler and Alexa Nossek, 89–108, Münster: mentis.
3. Alexander, Larry and Michael Moore. 2021. Deontological Ethics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 〈https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/ethics-deontological/〉. Accessed 30 May 2022.
4. Anderson, Joel. 2014. Regimes of Autonomy. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17:355–368.
5. Beauchamp, Tom L. and James F. Childress. 2013. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 7th edition, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.