Abstract
AbstractIt is a widespread notion that certain rights duties put categorical constraints on the actions of any rational agent, whereas other rights or duties that can be weighed against each other, based on the value of the goods affected. Both assumptions, however, seem to exclude each other in a theoretical perspective. In this article, I will nevertheless propose an approach, how to reconcile them. The starting point for this proposal is the idea that any action must be justifiable to the persons concerned. Against this backdrop, I try to show that submitting another person to a strategic calculus of weighing goods cannot be justified to her if the goods in question cannot be separated from that person, i.e. are in a certain perspective “identical” with her, as with the good of life. This also opens a perspective to reconcile deontological and consequentialist ethics.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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