Abstract
AbstractIn this paper, we investigate the relationship between individual rationality and price informative efficiency studying a prediction market model where agents repeatedly bet on the occurrence of a binary event following their subjective beliefs. We define individual rationality in terms of the amount of past observations used to update beliefs. In this way, a wide spectrum of rationality levels emerges, ranging from zero-intelligence to Bayesian learning. We show that the relationship between individual rationality and price informative efficiency is nonlinear and U-shaped. We argue that the results emerge from the particular interaction of two evolutionary forces operating at different levels: the market selection mechanism that moves wealth toward more accurate agents and the individual learning process that moves posterior probabilities over models depending on observed realizations.
Funder
Deutsches Zentrum für Hochschul- und Wissenschaftsforschung GmbH (DZHW)
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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