Abstract
AbstractI argue that the logical perspective—the study of arguments as products—is not well integrated into pragma-dialectics. I show that the Validity Rule and the Argumentation Scheme Rule, despite being procedural rules, are, in a certain sense, “logical” rules. Subsequently, I distinguish and review three successive periods in the development of the logical dimension of pragma-dialectics: conventionalist, inferentialist and dualist, to reveal that none of them is completely satisfactory. I contend that, given the assumptions and conceptual apparatus of pragma-dialectics, the integration of the logical perspective, and especially of a suitable account of counterargumentation, requires the adoption of a conception of logic as a theory of reasons, as opposed to the traditional conception of logic as a theory of inferences. Understanding logic as a theory of the dialogical construction of reasons enables us to approach the study of the relationships between arguments and the weighing of opposing arguments.
Funder
Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Reference40 articles.
1. Alhambra J (2022) Argumentation by analogy and weighing of reasons. Informal Logic 42(4):749–785
2. Alhambra J (2023) A particularist approach to arguments by analogy. Argumentation 37:553–575
3. Biro J, Siegel H (1992) Normativity, argumentation and an epistemic theory of fallacies. In: van Eemeren FH, Grootendorst R, Blair JA, Willard CA (eds) Argumentation illuminated. SICSAT, Amsterdam, pp 85–103
4. Biro J, Siegel H (1997) Epistemic normativity, argumentation, and fallacies. Argumentation 11:277–292
5. Biro J, Siegel H (2006) Pragma-dialectic versus epistemic theories of arguing and arguments: rivals or partners? In: Houtlosser P, van Rees A (eds) Considering pragma-dialectics. Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ, pp 1–10