Abstract
AbstractIn the course of criticizing indirect forms of consequentialism Bernard Williams argued that because virtues of character enter into the very content of the self, they cannot be instrumentalised. They must, instead, be viewed as cognitive responses to intrinsic value. This paper investigates this argument and relates it to similar claims in the work of Sartre. The inalienability of the first personal point of view represents a common theme and informs a further argument that an agent can only think of him or herself as merely one amongst others via a distinctive ethical use of the trope of irony.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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