Hinges, Disagreements, and Arguments: (Rationally) Believing Hinge Propositions and Arguing across Deep Disagreements-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Hinges, Disagreements, and Arguments: (Rationally) Believing Hinge Propositions and Arguing across Deep Disagreements

Published:2019-01-02 Issue:5 Volume:40 Page:1107-1116
ISSN:0167-7411
Container-title:Topoi
language:en
Short-container-title:Topoi

Author:

Siegel Harvey^ORCID

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Philosophy

Link

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11245-018-9625-6.pdf

Reference16 articles.

1. Carter JA (2017) Epistemic pluralism, epistemic relativism and “hinge” epistemology. In: Coliva A, Pedersen NJLL (eds) Epistemic pluralism. Series: Palgrave innovations in philosophy. Palgrave, Basingstoke, pp. 229–249

2. Coliva A (2015) Extended rationality: a hinge epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke

3. Coliva A (2016) Review of Pritchard, Epistemic angst: radical skepticism and the groundlessness of our believing. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, June 29 2016

4. Coliva A, Pedersen NJLL (2017) Epistemic pluralism. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke

5. Fogelin R (1985) The logic of deep disagreements. Informal Log 7(1):1–8. Reprinted as part of a special issue devoted to deep disagreement. Informal Log 25(1) (2005)

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