The pseudo-average rule: bankruptcy, cost allocation and bargaining-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

The pseudo-average rule: bankruptcy, cost allocation and bargaining

Published:2010-11-06 Issue:1 Volume:73 Page:55-73
ISSN:1432-2994
Container-title:Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
language:en
Short-container-title:Math Meth Oper Res

Author:

Ortells Txus,Santos Juan Carlos

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Management Science and Operations Research,General Mathematics,Software

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00186-010-0333-2.pdf

Reference23 articles.

1. Albizuri MJ, Santos JC, Zarzuelo JM (2002) On the serial cost sharing rule. Int J Game Theor 31: 437–446

2. Aumann RJ, Maschler M (1985) Game-theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud. J Econ Theor 36: 195–213

3. Aumann RJ, Shapley LS (1974) Values of non-atomic games. Princeton University Press, Princeton

4. Calvo E (1989) Solución de alternativas no dominadas iguales en el problema del regateo. Ph.D. thesis Department of Applied Economics IV, University of the Basque Country

5. Calvo E, Santos JC (2000) A value for multichoice games. Math Soc Sci 40: 341–354

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