Abstract
AbstractIf I decide to disclose information about myself, this act may undermine other people’s ability to conceal information about them. Such dependencies are called privacy dependencies in the literature. Some say that privacy dependencies generate moral duties to avoid sharing information about oneself. If true, we argue, then it is sometimes justified for others to impose harm on the person sharing information to prevent them from doing so. In this paper, we first show how such conclusions arise. Next, we show that the existence of such a dependency between the moral significance you are inclined to attribute to privacy dependencies and judgments about permissible self-defense puts pressure on at least some ways of spelling out the idea that privacy dependencies ought to constrain our data-sharing conduct.
Funder
Carlsbergfondet
Royal Danish Library, Aarhus University Library
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Artificial Intelligence,Human-Computer Interaction,Philosophy
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