The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems

Published:2007-04-19 Issue:3-4 Volume:36 Page:333-352
ISSN:0020-7276
Container-title:International Journal of Game Theory
language:en
Short-container-title:Int J Game Theory

Author:

Biró Péter,Cechlárová Katarína,Fleiner Tamás

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,Economics and Econometrics,Social Sciences (miscellaneous),Mathematics (miscellaneous),Statistics and Probability

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00182-007-0084-3.pdf

Reference29 articles.

1. Abeledo H, Rothblum UG (1995) Paths to marriage stability. Discret Appl Math 63:1–12

2. Abraham DJ, Biró P, Manlove DF (2006) “Almost stable” matchings in the roommates problem. In: Proceedings of WAOA 2005: the 3rd workshop on approximation and online algorithms. Lecture notes in computer science, vol 3879, pp 1–14

3. Aharoni R, Fleiner T (2003) On a lemma of Scarf. J Comb Theory Ser B 87:72–80

4. Angelov N (2006) Modelling firm mergers as a roommates problem (preprint)

5. Blum Y, Rothblum UG (2002) “Timing is everything” and marital bliss. J Econ Theory 103:429-443

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