Author:
Kawamura Kohei,Vlaseros Vasileios
Abstract
AbstractWe develop a unified derivation of asymmetric pure strategy equilibria and their optimality in the canonical common interest voting model of Austen-Smith and Banks (Am Polit Sci Rev 90(1):34–45, 1996). We also study the relationship between the most efficient equilibria, which have a remarkably simple and intuitive structure, and the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium that has been commonly studied in the literature. In particular, while the efficiency in the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium under unanimity rule is known to be decreasing in the number of voters, the efficiency does not depend on the number of voters above a threshold in the most efficient equilibria.
Funder
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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